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The Problem of Official Discretion in Anti-Terrorism Law: 
a comment on  R. v. KHAWAJA 
 
By W. Wesley Pue & Robert Russo1 
 
Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) was passed with great haste in the immediate 
wake of the notorious September 11 attacks on the United States.  The Act made 
extensive amendments to Canada’s Criminal Code in order to curtail some forms of 
terrorist activity.2  Its form and substance are complicated considerably by its global 
reach and by its efforts to criminalize terrorist support networks as well as terrorists 
themselves. 
Moreover, not all acts of violence or disruption, even within Canada, amount to 
“terrorism.”  One distinguishing feature is that, in order to qualify as “terrorist activity”, 
specified acts or omissions must “in whole or in part” be aimed at furthering “a political, 
religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause.”3  The legislation’s authors 
emphasized their desire to target only “terrorists, and not minorities or religious groups” 
and the Act contains an express exclusion from the realm of “terrorist activity” of “the 
expression of political, religious or ideological ideas that are not intended to cause the 
various forms of harm set out in the definition.”4  
                                                 
1
 W. Wesley Pue is Professor of Law and Nathan T. Nemetz Chair in Legal History, Faculty of Law, University of British 
Columbia.  Robert Russo is a Ph.D. student in law at the University of British Columbia.  We are grateful to Robert Diab 
and Adi Meir for many conversations on anti-terrorism law and policy and for the opportunity to review their writings in the 
area.  Our thinking has benefited from the leadership provided by the Australian National University in organizing the 
“Regulating Deviance: The Redirection of Criminalisation and the Futures of Criminal Law” Conference at the Oñati 
International Institute for the Sociology of Law, Onati, Spain (14-15 June, 2007).  In particular we are grateful to Miriam 
Gani and Penelope Mathew for their thoughtful insights. 
2
 No country has entirely disavowed fomenting actions that would otherwise be deemed “terrorist” when directed against its 
enemies.  Political rhetoric obscures this, but this simple fact explains much of the complexity in most anti-terrorism codes. 
3
 Anti-Terrorism Act Section 83.01(1)(b)(i)(A). (“ATA”) 
4
 Department of Justice, online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/anti_terr/context.html> 
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The preponderance of independent expert opinion views the Act’s wording as 
dangerously vague, overly-broad, inviting racial and religious screening by state 
authorities.5   Such issues came before the courts for the first time by way of preliminary 
motion in criminal proceedings.    The adage that hard facts make bad law is called to 
mind by the case as Mr. Mohammad Momin Khawaja stands accused of truly heinous 
crimes.  The allegations against him are such as to render him an unlikely candidate for 
judicial sympathy.  In R v. Khawaja6 Mr. Justice Rutherford had to determine whether 
the ATA’s provisions dealing with the financing, participating, facilitating, instructing 
and harbouring of terrorism or terrorist activities were unconstitutional on account of 
over-breadth or vagueness.   Widely perceived “as a strong law-and-order judge who's 
tough on crime,” Mr. Justice Rutherford surprised at least some observers7 when he 
concluded that Canada’s legislated definition of “terrorist activity” was unconstitutional 
to the extent that it required “proof that a person was motivated by ideological, religious 
or political purpose in the activity for which they've been charged.”8   
Mr. Justice Rutherford stressed his unease with a “procedure whereby a single, 
appointed judge of a seriously under-resourced trial court is asked to review and declare 
provisions of federal legislation recently enacted to deal with a most pressing problem to 
be unconstitutional on the basis only of written opinions without a specific factual 
foundation or expert evidence on which to base such a finding.”9  Prudent judges 
hesitate to reach too far and Mr. Justice Rutherford’s ruling is, unsurprisingly, notable 
                                                 
5
 In addition to the sources cited in the Khawaja ruling, see, for example: Mark Burgess, “Terrorism:  The Problem of 
Definition” (August 1, 2003), online: Center for Defense Information 
http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1564&from_page=../ program/document.cfm; W. 
Wesley Pue, “War on Terror: Constitutional Governance in a State of Permanent Warfare” (2002 Laskin Lecture in Public 
Law, Osgoode Hall Law School), (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall Law Journal (Special Issue on Civil Disobedience, Civil 
Liberties, and Civil Resistance, edited by Harry Glasbeek and Judy Fudge), 267-292.  
6
 R. v. Khawaja 2006 WL 3031774 (Ont. S.C.J.) (“Khawaja”) 
7
 Sean McKibbon, “Some Strange Cases in Ottawa’s Courts This Year” (29 December 2006) Ottawa Sun, online: 
<http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/WeirdNews/2006/12/29/3078907-sun.html> 
8
 Katerina Ossenova, “Canada Judge Rules Terror Definition In Anti-Terror Law Unconstitutional” (24 October 2006), 
online: Jurist http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/10/canada-judge-rules-terror-definition.php  So far so good.  The 
spokesperson’s further observation that “[e]ssentially, this ruling means there is no definition of terrorism," verges on the 
hysterical, however. 
9
 Khawaja at para 5. 
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for its caution and, indeed, conservatism.  Though “striking down” a key component of 
Parliament’s definition of terrorist activity is high drama of sorts, the “main story” lies 
elsewhere.  The ruling is more notable for the deference shown to Parliament than for its 
boldness in seeking to ensure Parliament’s respect for the rule of law.  With the single 
exception of the motive clause, the constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act was 
affirmed.  Significantly, only that portion of the Act setting out a requirement for 
ideological, religious or political motivations (s. 83.01) was deemed unconstitutional.10   
Momin Khawaja, an Ottawa software designer in his mid-20s at the relevant time, 
was charged under sections 83.18 (participation in terrorist activity) and 83.19 
(facilitating terrorist activity) of the Criminal Code of Canada.  The prosecution 
commenced under a cloud of secrecy.  The RCMP revealed only that Mr. Khawaja was 
arrested in March 2004 under Project Awaken, an operation involving coordination with 
the Ottawa Police Service11 and that the ATA’s preventive arrest provisions had not 
been used.12    A ban was imposed on “publication of all but the most basic facts related 
to Momin Khawaja's arrest and continued imprisonment,”13 extending even to 
information and arguments presented during court proceedings.  Though it was 
acknowledged that the matter was related to alleged “terrorist activity” in London, 
England,14 no detailed information was divulged within Canada.  The RCMP assured 
Ottawa’s Muslim Community that the force “has a zero tolerance policy towards racial 
profiling and racially biased policing…The RCMP does not target individuals or groups 
based on their racial, cultural or religious backgrounds.”15 
                                                 
10
 Ibid. at para. 9.  The specific section is 83.01(1)(b)(i)(A). 
11
 “RCMP statement regarding the case of Mohammad Momin Khawaja” (2 April 2004) RCMP News Release, online: < 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdnsecurity/rcmp_release040402.html> 
12
 “RCMP Lays Charges under Sections 83.18 and 83.19 of the Criminal Code” (30 March 2004) RCMP News Release, 
online < http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/news/2004/n_0413_e.htm> 
13
 Chris Cobb, “Ottawa Man Faces 5 New Terror Charges” (21 December 2005) Ottawa Citizen, online: 
<http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/story.html?id=10921549-749a-4a61-bf02-0a41ee4dd07d&k=87993>.  In the lead-
up to the trial, Justice Department spokesman Patrick Charette speculated: "It's difficult to speculate where this could 
go…but yes, technically a total ban could be imposed (for security reasons).” 
14
 Supra note 12. 
15
 Ibid. 
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The shape of the thing began to emerge only as information came out concerning 
the trial of seven individuals charged with terrorism offences in the United Kingdom.  It 
was revealed during the course of legal proceedings there that Khawaja was thought to 
have played a "vital role" in a terrorist plot to attack Britain's electricity supply, pubs, 
nightclubs and trains.16    The Crown’s opening statement in R. v. Khyam, Garcia, 
Hussain, Akbar, Mahmood, Mahmood, and Amin asserted that "Momin Khawaja 
constitutes the Canadian end of the conspiracy.  He awaits trial in Canada in relation to 
items found in his home in Ontario, and indeed in relation to his contact with the 
defendants you are concerned with and his vital role in this plot."17 
Khawaja was brought to trial on the Attorney General of Canada’s direct 
indictment, by-passing the normal preliminary inquiry process.  Seven offences were 
alleged to have been committed between January 2002 and March 2004,18 each count 
identifying the British defendant “Omar Khyam” and “others” as the “terrorist group” 
with which Khawaja conspired.  The allegations included development of an explosive 
detonator, contributing to terrorist groups with the intent of causing damage to persons 
and property, and facilitating terrorist activity19 in Canada, the United Kingdom and 
Pakistan.   When an application was filed questioning the constitutional validity of 
various provisions in the ATA Mr. Justice Rutherford was called upon to rule on two key 
issues.  
“Motive” and Racial Profiling 
 First, he assessed the “motivation” clause, comparing the provision with 
                                                 
16
 Canadian Helped Prepare U.K. Bomb Plot” (21 March 2006) CTV, online: 
<http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060321/khawaja_trial_060321?s_name=&no_ads=> 
17 'Momin Khawaja constitutes the Canadian end of the conspiracy' canada.com Published: Thursday, March 23, 2006 
Prepared text of the Crown's opening statement in the trial of seven men alleged to have plotted to bomb London: “Regina v. 
Omar Khyam, Anthony Garcia, Nabeel Hussain, Jawad Akbar, Waheed Mahmood, Shujah-Ud-Din Mahmood, Salahuddin 
Amin,  Opening Note” (http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=408dc2ed-d950-4ee5-a4b7-
392eb5faaf34&k=75162 )  
18
 the counts alleged violations of Sections 81(1)(a), 81(1)(d), 83.01(1), 83.03(a), 83.18,  83.18(1), 83.19, 83.2, 83.21(1) (all 
under the Terrorism Part of the Canadian Criminal Code) 
19
 Khawaja at paras. 1(1)-1(7). 
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conventional notions of criminal responsibility,20 and assessing the effect of approaching 
the definition of a criminal offence by reference to motivation (rather than by action and 
intent) on the day-to-day world of criminal justice.  The Act provides: 
83.01 (1) The following definitions apply in this Part.  
"terrorist activity" means 
(a) an act or omission that is committed in or outside Canada and that, if 
committed in Canada, is one of the following offences: … 
(b) an act or omission, in or outside Canada,  
(i) that is committed  
(A) in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological 
purpose, objective or cause, and  
(B) in whole or in part with the intention of intimidating the 
public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, 
including its economic security, or compelling a person, a 
government or a domestic or an international organization to 
do or to refrain from doing any act, whether the public or the 
person, government or organization is inside or outside 
Canada, and 
(ii) that intentionally  
(A) causes death or serious bodily harm to a person by the use 
of violence,  
(B) endangers a person’s life,  
(C) causes a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or 
any segment of the public,  
(D) causes substantial property damage, whether to public or 
private property, if causing such damage is likely to result in 
the conduct or harm referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C), or  
(E) causes serious interference with or serious disruption of an 
essential service, facility or system, whether public or private, 
other than as a result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage 
of work that is not intended to result in the conduct or harm 
referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C), 
(1.1) For greater certainty, the expression of a political, religious or ideological 
thought, belief or opinion does not come within paragraph (b) of the definition 
                                                 
20
 Lawyers, in Canada, draw distinctions between speech, motive, and intent.  The general law on motive is that "Motives do 
not excuse the commission of crime or even mitigate its punishment. Some motives such as hate bias are, however, deemed 
aggravating factors in sentencing." (Kent Roach, The New Terrorism Offences in Canadian Criminal Law, (2002) 14 
N.C.J.L. 115 at 124, as cited by Mr. Justice Rutherford, Khawaja at para. 34) 
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“terrorist activity” in subsection (1) unless it constitutes an act or omission that 
satisfies the criteria of that paragraph.21  
 
Although the nature of the proceedings meant that Rutherford J. lacked the benefit of 
either "specific factual foundation or expert evidence,"22 he approached the matter 
carefully and fully, engaging in a thorough survey of both scholarly literature and 
comparative anti-terrorism legislation.  His frame of reference here was the real world of 
police work, intelligence gathering, imperfect information, and human interactions.  The 
"motive" clause was ruled unconstitutional because it does nothing to enhance the 
effectiveness of state authorities in counter-terrorist work, and yet it produces an 
increased likelihood of inappropriate targeting of minority groups “through racial or 
ethnic profiling and prejudice.”23  The net result in this aspect is that “the Crown now 
has one less element of the criminal offence which it has to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”24    
Overbreadth and Vagueness 
Secondly, the court considered Khawaja’s argument that the Anti-Terrorism 
provisions as a whole are so ill-defined, vague, and over-broad as to be unconstitutional 
in toto.  Although it is pervasively imprecise, Mr. Justice Rutherford held that the 
overall legislative scheme passes constitutional muster.   
The two portions of Rutherford J.’s ruling sit uneasily together, yet each is 
logically developed, faithful to authority, and thoughtful on its own terms.  The 
inconsistency within the ruling points to a fundamental incoherence in the substrata of 
                                                 
21
 ATA S. 83.01 (http://laws.justice.gc.ca/fr/ShowDoc/cs/C-46/bo-ga:l_II_1::bo-
ga:l_III/fr?page=3&isPrinting=false#codese:83_01) 
22
 Khawaja at para. 5. 
23
 Khawaja at para. 52. 
24
 Final Report of the Subcommittee on Public Safety and National Security of the Standing Committee on Public Safety 
and National Security (2007),  Rights, Limits, Security: A Comprehensive Review Of The Anti-Terrorism Act And Related 
Issues Chapter One: Introduction 
(http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/391/secu/reports/rp2798914/sterrp07/09_Chap2_Eng.htm)  The 
Subcommittee stated its opinion that the “inclusion of motive as a part of a criminal offence to be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt is unusual, if not unprecedented in Canada, it constitutes a safeguard in this context. For these reasons, the 
Subcommittee has concluded that the political, religious, or ideological motive element of the definition of terrorist activity 
should be retained.” 
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Canadian constitutional law.  Whereas the courts focus much on social facts in certain 
“Charter” areas, they tend to remain resolutely formalist and highly deferential to 
Parliament in other fields.  Mr. Justice Rutherford’s ruling breaks on this fault line.  His 
approach to the constitutionality of the “motive” element in terrorism offences reflects a 
deep concern with how law actually works in real life.  This portion of the ruling is 
concerned with law “in action,” with real life.  It focuses, not on words on paper or on 
how they might be constitutionally construed in the rarefied atmosphere of superior 
courts, but with the daily rituals of implementation that play themselves out as state 
bureaucrats, security officials, police officers, and investigators interact with each other 
and with those subject to their power on a day-to-day basis.  If police and security 
officials are told to look for religious or political motivations as part of the definition of 
crimes, their inclination to focus disproportionate attention on minority religious or 
political groups will be accentuated.  The presumed context of social interactions, of the 
micro-physics of power, is front-and-centre of Mr. Justice Rutherford’s reasoning. 
When it comes to the inherent vagueness of the terrorism provisions in toto, 
however, the quotidian realm gives way to another.  This alternative world is inhabited 
exclusively by learned lawyers, Superior Court justices, and the sort of well-meaning, 
well-informed, state officials who read obscure constitutional law treatises in their spare 
time, who contemplate the finer points of the Oakes25 test in quiet moments – and who 
understand it.  The beat cop in this world has legal learning on par with Superior Court 
Justices, the patience of Job, and the wisdom of Solomon.  In stark contrast to his ruling 
on the “motivation” provisions, the possibility that state officials might be insufficiently 
guided or even lead astray by poorly chosen statutory language is not treated as a serious 
possibility in this domain. The focus here is the courtroom where judges are able to 
insist upon constitutional constructions of words that admit freely of many other 
alternatives.  Any sense of “law in action” is gone.  The fundamental legal realist 
                                                 
25R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. 
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appreciation that many nasty things can occur without Superior Courts ever being called 
into action is entirely absent.   
The cleavage between these two portions of the ruling is stark: a critically 
informed legal realism is met by an equal and opposite force.  This inconsistency is the 
most noteworthy -  and surely the most curious – feature of Mr. Justice Rutherford’s 
ruling.  It is forced upon him higher authority.  The legal standards established by the 
Supreme Court of Canada on vagueness and overbreadth, allow for the creation of 
offences even by words so uncertain as to provide no meaningful guidance to persons 
subject to them.26  In fact, a single-minded determination to find precision of meaning 
where the “plain language” reveals none is the only approach capable sustaining the 
Anti-Terrorism Act.  This is a disturbing outcome because a system of government 
based on imprecise rules violates a fundamental principle of legality.   
Canada's standard of constitutional vagueness is extremely low and irrationally 
court-focused.  The test is only whether lawyers will be "able to debate the potential 
boundaries of the provisions in court."27   
Lawyers, of course, are well able to debate most anything.   
 
The Rule of Law 
Although there is no explicit provision in Canada’s written constitution requiring 
legislative clarity, something equivalent flows from the principle of the rule of law.28    
At its core the vagueness doctrine seeks to ensure confidence that the laws governing 
                                                 
26
 Khawaja at paras. 6, 14-27; see discussion in W. Wesley Pue, “Protecting Constitutionalism in Treacherous Times:  Why 
“Rights” Don’t Matter”, in Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew, eds., Ensuring Accountability: Terrorist Challenges and 
State Responses in a Free Society  (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University-E Press, 2008)   
27
 Khawaja at para. 18; R. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031 (S.C.C.) (“Canadian Pacific”) 
28
 The status of the rule of law as a foundation principle of the Canadian constitution, is implied in the Constitutions Act, 
1867 and explicitly reaffirmed in the preamble of the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.  See also Roncarelli v. Duplessis, 
[1959] S.C.R. 121. 
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Canadians “must meet a certain level of precision.”29  The rule of law, as Albert Venn 
Dicey famously observed, requires 
 that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods 
except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before 
the ordinary Courts of the land. In this sense the rule of law is contrasted with 
every system of government based on the exercise by persons in authority of 
wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint.30  
 
The Supreme Court of Canada assigns the doctrine status as an interpretive 
principle to be applied to other Charter provisions, most notably sections 7 and 1.  
Section 7 guarantees the right to “life, liberty and security of the person and the right not 
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”  
Section 1 provides that all of the Charter’s rights and freedoms are subject “only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.”31  Imprecision of statutory wording is addressed in the first place 
by means of canons of statutory interpretation (classically, the principle that penal 
statutes are strictly construed) and constitutional law as such becomes relevant when 
ordinary interpretive principles prove insufficient.  The vagueness doctrine comes into 
play when a statute that violates the Charter fails to find justification under s.1 because it 
so imprecise as to fail to amount to a “limit prescribed by law.”  Imprecision can also 
lead to unconstitutional overbreadth violating the required proportionality between 
rights infringement and legislative objectives.32 
The principles at stake here are both simple and important.  It is important not to 
lose sight of them as the complexities inherent in their working-out are encountered.  
                                                 
29
 Marc Ribeiro, Limiting Arbitrary Power: The Vagueness Doctrine in Canadian Constitutional Law (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2004) at 1. 
30
 Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1897) 5th Edition, London Macmillan And Co., Limited New 
York: The Macmillan Company 1897 
(http://olldownload.libertyfund.org/Texts/LFBooks/Dicey0089/LawOfConstitution1897ed/1316_Bk.pdf ) (179-180) 
31
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 1. (“Charter of Rights and Freedoms”) 
32
 R. v. Oakes, supra note 25. (Under section 1 analysis, or “OAKES test,” there must be proportionality between the rights 
violation and the legislative objective, which includes that the violation be as minimal as reasonably possible). 
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Clarity in law-making is required in order to provide fair notice to those subject to the 
law and to limit the arbitrary exercise of power by state officials.  The rule of law seeks 
restraints on the discretion of law enforcement in order to constrain human bias, to 
ensure the “even-handedness in the administration of justice” and, consequently, to 
reduce the arbitrary application of power.33 
In R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society 34 the Supreme Court of Canada 
articulated the modern doctrine of overbreadth and vagueness.  The Court held that 
offences must be defined through statute rather than by judges (anything else amounts to 
ex post facto law-making) and that statutes must have some limits in scope.  So far, so 
good.  In Pharmaceutical Society, the Court zeroed in on the absolute legal dimensions 
of “fair notice.” In doing so the court unfortunately qualified the seemingly clear 
principles it had articulated.  The principles were lost entirely in encountering 
complexities in application.  It was not, the court said, necessary for individuals to 
actually know the law – or, it might be said, have the capacity to learn it – provided only 
that they could subjectively understand that their conduct is regulated by law in a way 
that is consistent with the “substratum of values” in Canadian society: 
The substantive aspect of fair notice is therefore a subjective 
understanding that the law touches upon some conduct, based on the 
substratum of values underlying the legal enactment and on the role that the 
legal enactment plays in the life of the society… I do not wish to suggest that 
the State can only intervene through law when some non-legal basis for 
intervention exists.  Many enactments are relatively narrow in scope and echo 
little of society at large; this is the case with many regulatory enactments.  The 
weakness or the absence of substantive [page635] notice before the enactment 
can be compensated by bringing to the attention of the public the actual terms 
of the law, so that substantive notice will be achieved….. A certain connection 
between the formal and substantive aspects of fair notice can be seen here. Fair 
notice may not have been given when enactments are in somewhat general 
terms, in a way that does not readily permit citizens to be aware of their 
substance, when they do not relate to any element of the substratum of values 
                                                 
33
 Ribeiro supra note 29 at 40. 
34
 Canada v. Pharmaceutical Society (Nova Scotia) [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 (S.C.C.). 
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held by society.  It is no coincidence that these enactments are often found 
vague.35   
 
In other words, imprecise prohibitions could be sustained if connection with Canada’s 
“substratum of values” would be clear to any non-lawyer (“it’s disapproved; I should 
assume its illegal”) or if the fair notice concerns have been met by publicity campaigns 
prior to any law enforcement.36  Gonthier J. declined to consider hypothetical scenarios 
arising from vague wording, stating that a law should “only be declared 
unconstitutionally vague where a court has embarked upon the interpretive process, but 
has concluded that interpretation is not possible.”37   
Canadian legal doctrine in the “anti-terrorism” area in particular has developed 
considerably since the 2001 attacks on the United States.  Approximately eight months 
after the September 11 attacks, the Supreme Court of Canada issued judgment in two 
cases dealing with the deportation of alleged terrorists on the theory that their actions 
before coming to Canada endangered Canadian security.  In both Ahani v. Canada38 and 
Suresh v. Canada39 the Supreme Court heard arguments that phrases such as “danger to 
the security of Canada” and “terrorism” in deportation provisions of the Immigration 
Act were unconstitutionally vague.  The Court did not agree with these arguments, citing 
its 1992 precedent in R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society  that a law would be 
found unconstitutionally vague only “if it so lacks in precision as not to give sufficient 
guidance for legal debate.”40     
 
With respect to the doctrine of overbreadth, there are several constitutional 
principles that be heeded.  For the purposes of legislation interpretation, 
legislative statutes “are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical 
                                                 
35
 Ibid. at paras. 48-50. 
36
 Supra note 34 at 639 
37
 R. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd.  [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031 (S.C.C.) at para. 79, 
38
 Ahani v. Canada (2002) 208 D.L.R. (4th) 66, 156 O.A.C. 37, 91 C.R.R. (2d) 145 
39
 Suresh v. Canada [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1 
40
 Supra note 34 at para. 71. 
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and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, 
and the intention of Parliament.”41  This is an approach that is explicitly designed 
to minimize the alleged overbreadth in question.   There is also the presumption 
that a provision should be read constitutionally – that is, that Parliament had 
intended to enact legislative provisions that are not unconstitutional.42  This 
general presumption can also be extended to mean  that the use of “broad and 
general terms in legislation may be justified. In identifying what they wish to 
legislate against, legislators cannot be expected to identify every variation of the 
factual situations they envisage.”43    
 
Two principles guide the Canadian judiciary’s approach to broad or vague 
legislation – absurdity and deference.  In Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. the majority 
explained the principle that statutes should be “interpreted to avoid absurd results means 
that where a provision is open to more than one possible meaning, Parliament is 
presumed not to have intended to attach penal consequences to trivial or minimal 
violations of it. The absurdity principle allows for the narrowing of the scope of the 
provision”44 (after the judges have ruled, it might be added).  And in determining 
whether a provision is overbroad, the judiciary has adopted a measure of deference to 
the methods selected by the legislature in effecting its policy goals.45   
This leaves unanswered the question of how to control for the practical dangers 
associated with leaving policy-making decisions in the hands of law enforcement 
officials: 
 
A law must set an intelligible standard both for the citizens it governs 
                                                 
41
 R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 at 74, quoting from Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed. (Toronto: 
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and the officials who must enforce it. The two are interconnected. A vague 
law prevents the citizen from realizing when he or she is entering an area of 
risk for criminal sanction. It similarly makes it difficult for law enforcement 
officers and judges to determine whether a crime has been committed. This 
invokes the further concern of putting too much discretion in the hands of 
law enforcement officials, and violates the precept that individuals should 
be governed by the rule of law, not the rule of persons. The doctrine of 
vagueness is directed generally at the evil of leaving "basic policy matters 
to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective 
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application.”46 
 
The Court’s concern respecting vagueness is thus directed to fair notice to those 
subject to the law on one hand and the limitation of arbitrary power on the other.  More 
generally, the Court sought to strike a balance between executive or administrative 
flexibility and the rule of law.  No one can fault the principles here. 
But the actual outcome reached by the Supreme Court of Canada sets a very high 
threshold for “vagueness” or, conversely, a very low threshold for rule of law values.  
The doctrine’s basis – the need to provide “fair notice” to those individuals whose 
conduct may be regulated by law and placing limits on law enforcement officials’ 
discretion – has been fatally undermined by a formulation that puts court interpretation 
in front of social life.  This ensures that, in the ordinary course of events, enormously 
vague and unconstrained powers will be exercised by officials, invisibly to the courts, 
for years and possibly for decades.  It leaves officials in the uncomfortable position of 
exercising powers without the benefit of clear Parliamentary direction and enjoying only 
the modest comfort of looking forward to ex post facto endorsement or condemnation of 
their actions by the courts.  Even the stance of deference to Parliament is illusory at best.  
As vague wording is at issue, the deference accorded can only, in fact, be official 
discretion unfettered (because the empowering words are vague) by Parliamentary 
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guidance.  Paradoxically, deferring to Parliament’s establishment of such a scheme 
relegates Parliament itself to the sidelines.  Only executive power emerges triumphant. 
 
Application in Khawaja 
Because Khawaja’s application was presented without the benefit of having heard 
evidence,47 his counsel, Edward Greenspon, made several hypothetical arguments 
pointing to the ways in which individuals entirely lacking in moral culpability for 
anything approaching terrorist acts could nonetheless find themselves in contravention 
of the ATA’s prohibition on facilitating terrorist groups: even the term “facilitate” itself 
was said to be vague and over-broad. 48 
Greenspon specifically criticized s. 83.01(1)(b), arguing that existing federal laws 
in the Criminal Code of Canada were “broad enough to catch and provide for 
prosecution of virtually all of the terrorist acts” foreseen by the ATA.49  He criticized the 
breadth of clause 83.01(1) (b) (i) (A), that the act be committed, "in whole or in part for 
a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause," and again for the use of 
"in whole or in part" in 83.01(1) (b)(i)(B), arguing that virtually any act will be at least 
in some part for such purposes, and that a partial intention, no matter how small, is 
inadequate to circumscribe the area of risk and leaves the legislation excessively broad.50  
Essentially, he argued that the ATA provisions were too broad and too vague to be 
considered constitutional.   
Mr. Justice Rutherford noted, citing the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal’s decision 
in R. v. Spindloe,51 that laws are rarely declared unconstitutional on account of 
vagueness in Canada.   He correctly cited the two pillars of the doctrine, namely the 
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need to provide “fair notice” and the need to curb the discretion of law enforcement 
officials at least to the extent that convictions will not “automatically flow from the 
decision to prosecute”52 (a stunningly low threshold).  Following the reasoning laid by 
Gonthier J. in Pharmaceutical Society, he sought to uncouple the degree of precision 
sufficient to escape unconstitutional voidness from certainty of outcome.53  “The degree 
of precision required in our laws is not, however, to lay out a prescription such that one 
can predict with certainty the outcome of all conceivable factual situations. There are not 
enough draftspersons to accomplish anything like that.”54  This formulation is a counsel 
of despair that comes perilously close to justifying governance by administrative fiat 
merely because perfect foresight and absolute linguistic certainty are unattainable goals.  
The provisions were upheld because Mr. Justice Rutherford believed that they 
“describe conduct in a fashion that provides notice of what is prohibited and set an 
intelligible standard for both citizen and law enforcement officials…The prohibited 
actions are all spelled out with reasonable precision in terms of their intended harmful 
consequences in 83.01(1)(b)(ii) (A) - (E) of the definition.”55  Following R. v. Canadian 
Pacific Ltd. he declined to entertain “hypothetical circumstances that test the periphery 
of a legislated prohibition,” holding that the clear identification and application to a 
“core of misconduct” is all that is relevant.56 
The conclusion is reached that conduct described with the use of terms such as "in 
whole or in part", "directly or indirectly”, “serious”, and “substantial” are not 
impermissibly vauge.57   “The criminal law has long been challenged to differentiate 
between degrees of harm. Such terms as bodily harm, aggravated assault, and criminal 
negligence have been interpreted and applied on a case-by-case basis so that the 
boundaries and contents of the provisions are sufficiently clear to comport with 
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fundamental justice. So too can these adjectives in the impugned provisions.”58 
 
With respect to the over breadth and potential unconstitutionality of the ATA 
provisions, Mr. Justice Rutherford relied heavily upon the reasoning of Fuerst J. in R. v. 
Lindsay, correctly pointing out that Madam Justice Fuerst had encountered arguments 
similar to those presented in the Khawaja application.  He endorsed her conclusions that 
verbs and adjectives such as “to facilitate” and “serious” have “sufficiently clear 
meaning”  to escape the finding of unconstitutional overbreadth or vagueness. 
Here too, he declined to entertain the hypothetical examples offered by Khawaja’s 
counsel, opting for a case-by-case application of the “absurdity principle” in dealing 
with situations where the accused might be considered a terrorist group unto himself, for 
example.59  Such an application, of course, does little to prevent law-enforcement 
officials from continuing to charge individuals in such cases, and nothing to constrain 
intrusive police or official actions conducted in the shadow of the law.  This presents a 
jarring contrast with Mr. Justice Rutherford’s approach to the “motivation” portion of 
the Anti-Terrorism Act.  In the final analysis, and within the particular constraints of a 
preliminary motion his Lordship accepted that the current legislation contains sufficient 
clarity to meet the fundamental constitutional requirement that people not be convicted 
of crimes (including terrorist crimes) unless they "intended" wrong-doing.   
The outcome of the Khawaja case will be pleasing to prosecutors.  Liberal 
Member of Parliament Irwin Cotler, a human-rights expert and former justice minister, 
pointed to irony in the fact that "it's defence counsel that is moving to impugn that 
provision, when in fact the prosecution may find that it will facilitate prosecutions 
without that provision.”60  And, speculating as to possible appeals, Conservative Justice 
Minister Vic Toews suggested that "[p]erhaps it may be the defence who would want to 
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appeal that decision.”61  
 
Conclusion 
Although the Act was upheld on its first courtroom test, the outcome is not a 
satisfactory one from the perspective of Canadian government principles.  Many 
portions of the Anti-Terrorism Act have an Alice-in-Wonderland character.  To take just 
one example, a person is said to "knowingly" facilitate terrorist activity even if: 
1. the facilitator does not know whether any particular terrorist activity "is 
facilitated,"  
2. no terrorist activity "was foreseen or planned", and  
3. no terrorist activity "was actually carried out." (s. 83.19(1)).   
There is little doubt that Ottawa's draftspersons are good enough to do better than this if 
they set their minds to it.   
Rights are affected powerfully by police, security officials, immigration officials, 
and others in many, many circumstances that never come before the courts.  While 
Canadians wait for a decision on the Defense’s request for a Leave to Appeal and a 
government request for a cross-appeal, Parliament has thus far not seen the need to 
clarify any provisions of the ATA62.  With respect, there is an enormous difference 
between recognizing the impossibility of drafting statutory language that allows of no 
ambiguity and a judicial approach to statutory interpretation that encourages sloppy 
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draftspersonship.  One can hope that the Supreme Court of Canada will revise its 
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines to bring their operations more fully into 
compliance with the principles that generate such doctrines in the first place.  Parliament 
too has responsibilities, however, as the principle trustee for Canadian constitutionalism.  
Since the Charter came into place, politicians have often elected to avoid controversial 
and difficult matters by leaving it to the courts to work things out.   It is, however, 
Parliament's job to define standards clearly, citizens' right to expect that, and the 
obligation of the Courts to insist upon it. 
Canada's Parliament has let Canadians down badly by failing to provide clear 
direction to either citizens or security officials under our Anti-Terrorism legislation. 
Despite the unattractive biography of Momin Khawaja, Mr. Justice Rutherford’s ruling 
in this case points to the need to reassess Anti-Terrorism legislation from a perspective 
informed by an appreciation and understanding of the Rule of Law. This transcends 
party politics and has nothing to do with being “soft on terrorists”.  A review that starts 
from fundamentals is needed and Parliament should have the courage to lead it.   
